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The Evolution of International Law:
colonial and postcolonial realities
ANTONY ANGHIE
ABSTRACT The colonial and postcolonial realities of international law have
been obscured by the analytical frameworks that governed traditional scholar-
ship on the subject. This article sketches out a history of the evolution of
international law that focuses in particular on the manner in which imperialism
shaped the discipline. It argues that colonialism, rather than being a peripheral
concern of the discipline, is central to the formation of international law and, in
particular, its founding concept, sovereignty. It argues that international law
has always been animated by the civilising mission, the project ofgoverning and
transforming non-European peoples, and that the current war on terror is an
extension of this project.
The colonial and postcolonial realities of international law have been
obscured and misunderstood as a consequence of a persistent and deep seated
set of ideas that has structured traditional scholarship on the history and
theory of international law. This article seeks to identify these structures,
suggesting ways in which they have limited the understanding of the
relationship between imperialism and international law. It then sketches a set
of alternative perspectives that may offer a better appreciation of the imperial
aspects of international law, and their enduring effects on the contemporary
international system. 1 My purpose, then, is to sketch a history of the
relationship between imperialism and international law in the evolution of
international law from the 16th century to the present, and to suggest a set
of analytic and conceptual tools that are adequate for the purposes of
illuminating this history.
The traditional understanding of international law regards colonialism-
and, indeed, non-European societies and their practices more generally-as
peripheral to the discipline proper because international law was a creation of
Europe. The explicitly and unquestionably European character of interna-
tionallaw has been powerfully and characteristically asserted by historians of
the discipline such as JHW Verzijl:
Now there is one truth that is not open to denial or even to doubt, namely that
the actual body of international law, as it stands today, not only is the product
of the conscious activity of the European mind, but also has drawn its vital
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essence from a common source of beliefs, and in both of these aspects it is
mainly of Western European origin.2
International law in this view consists of a series of doctrines and principles
that were developed in Europe, that emerged out of European history and
experience, and that were extended in time to the non-European world which
existed outside the realm of European international law.
Thus, for instance, the classical concept of sovereignty, which stipulated
that all sovereigns are equal and that sovereign states have absolute power
over their own territory, emerged from the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.
Non-European states lacked this sovereignty, and the development of
international law can be seen in part as the 'Expansion of International
Society',3 the process by which Westphalian sovereignty was extended to
include the societies of the non-European world. This process was tri-
umphantly completed through the mechanism of decolonisation that ensured
the emergence of sovereign states from what had previously been the
colonised societies of Asia, Africa and the Americas. Seen in this way, coloni-
sation was an unfortunate-but perhaps necessary-historical episode whose
effects have been largely reversed by the role that international law has played,
particularly through the United Nations system, of promoting decolonisation
by both institutional and doctrinal mechanisms. Whatever the earlier
associations between imperialism and international law, then, imperialism is
a thing of the past.
A further problematic that has preoccupied international law scholars and
that has inevitably shaped traditional understandings of the relationship
between colonialism and international law emerged most explicitly in the
19th century, when John Austin, an English jurist whose views had an
enormous significance for international law, argued that law and order were
only explicable in a system governed by an overarching sovereign that could
create and enforce the law. Consequently, international law could not be
regarded as law properly so called since the international system lacked such
a sovereign. This problematic emerged as a corollary of the Westphalian
model of sovereignty which stipulates the equality of sovereign states. Since
that time, at least, the question: 'how is legal order to be established among
equal and sovereign states?' has preoccupied the discipline, and the greatest
scholars of international law have developed numerous theories questioning
the Austinian paradigm and elaborating on how international law is 'law'
despite the absence of an overarching sovereign that legislates and then
enforces the law.
Finally, the history of international law is structured around the idea that
different phases of the history of the discipline were characterised by
distinctive styles of jurisprudence. Naturalism, which prevailed from the
beginnings of the modern discipline in the 16th century to roughly the end of
the 18th century, stipulated that international law was to be found in
'nature'; it could be ascertained through the employment of reason, and this
transcendent 'natural' law-which had religious origins-was binding on all
states. Positivism, the jurisprudence that has prevailed since the 19th century,
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and which continues to be the dominant mode of thinking, prescribes that a
state can only be bound by rules to which it has consented. Pragmatism is
associated with the emergence of international institutions that provided the
international system with a new set of technologies with which to address
international problems. All three strands of jurisprudence continue to playa
role in the international system. However, they are seen as embodying quite
distinctive ideas of law, society and the international system.
The non-European world plays an insignificant role within each of these
schemes. Certainly, the non-European world posed numerous problems to
the international system. How were these peoples to be governed? On what
legal basis could their lands be occupied? But these were viewed as practical,
secondary problems that did not impinge on the great theoretical issues
confronting the discipline. Rather, the principal analytic frameworks
governing the discipline precluded any real examination of non-European
societies and people, and the ways in which they impinged upon and shaped
the making of international law. For instance, the Austinian problem of 'how
is order to be created among sovereign states' prevents an exploration of the
status of the non-European societies that were designated as non-sovereign
by the jurisprudence of the time. The problem of 'order among sovereign
states' arises, then, only in the context of sovereign European states, and the
transformation of this problem into the central theoretical dilemma of the
discipline systematically occludes the study of non-European societies. It
avoids the question: how was it decided that non-European states were not
sovereign in the first place? Asking this question in turn raises further issues.
Rather than adopting the traditional view of sovereignty as an exclusively
European product extended into a non-European world that was somehow,
naturally, non-sovereign, we might see sovereignty doctrine as consisting in
part of mechanisms of exclusion which expel the non-European society from
the realm of sovereignty and power. This is then a prelude to the grand
redeeming project of bestowing sovereignty on the dark places of the earth.4
In other words, sovereignty doctrine expels the non-European world from its
realm, and then proceeds to legitimise the imperialism that resulted in the
incorporation of the non-European world into the system of international
law. The process of transforming the non-European world is completed
through decolonisation, which enables the non-European state to emerge as a
sovereign and equal member of the global community. In short, these
mechanisms of exclusion are as essential a part of the sovereignty doctrine
as the mechanisms of incorporation and transformation, colonialism
and decolonisation that are the subject of the conventional histories of
international law. And if, as I argue, the mechanisms of exclusion that
deprive the non-European world of 'Western' sovereignty persist and endure
despite the official end of the colonial period, then it might become necessary
to rethink the standard accounts of both colonialism and decolonisation. 5
Rather then focusing on the paradigm of 'order among sovereign states',
then, I would argue that the evolution of international law, and the role of
non-European societies within this process, may be better understood in
terms of the problem of cultural difference. International law may be seen as
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an attempt to establish a universal system of order among entItles
characterised as belonging to different cultural systems. This problem gives
rise to what might be termed the 'dynamic of difference': international law
posits a gap, a difference between European and non-European cultures and
peoples, the former being characterised, broadly, as civilised and the latter as
uncivilised (and all this implies in terms of the related qualities of each of
these labels).
This gap having been established, what follows is the formulation of
doctrines that are designed to efface this gap: to bring the uncivilized/
aberrant/violent/backward/oppressed into the realm of civilisation, the
universal order governed by (European) international law. This distinction
between the civilised and the uncivilised, the animating distinction of
imperialism, is crucial to the formation of sovereignty doctrine, which can be
understood as providing certain cultures with all the powers of sovereignty,
while excluding others. In short, cultural difference precedes and profoundly
shapes sovereignty doctrine-whereas the traditional approach asserts that
an established sovereignty manages the problem of cultural difference. This
basic dynamic is played out, in different vocabularies and doctrines,
throughout the history of international law. And, further, its replication in
all the distinctive styles of jurisprudence-naturalism, positivism and
pragmatism-suggests its profoundly enduring character. Colonialism, then,
far from being peripheral to the discipline of international law, is central to
its formation. It was only because of colonialism that international law
became universal; and the dynamic of difference, the civilising mission, that
produced this result, continues into the present.
The colonial origins of international law
Contact between European and non-European peoples, of course, has
taken place for many centuries. As the European presence in non-European
areas intensified, however, beginning in the 15th and 16th centuries, legal
doctrines were developed to manage more complex forms of interaction
between European and non-European states, and these extended, inevi-
tably, to doctrines that purported to account for the acquisition of
sovereignty over non-European peoples. These doctrines, invariably, were
created by Europeans, or adapted by Europeans, for their own purposes,
although scholarship has shown that many important international
legal principles relating, for example, to the law of treaties and the law of
war, were also developed, understood and practised by non-European
states.6
Many of these themes may be illustrated by an examination of a work
commonly regarded as one of the first texts of modern international law,
Francisco de Vitoria's On the Indians Lately Discovered.7 Vitoria here
addresses the complex legal problems that arose from Spanish claims to
sovereignty over the Americas following Columbus' voyage. Drawing upon
the naturalist and theological jurisprudence of the period, Vitoria argued that
all peoples, including the Indians, were governed by a basic 'natural law'.
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While others characterised the Indians as heathens, and animals, lacking any
cognisable rights, Vitoria instead humanely asserts of the Indians that:
the true state of the case is that they are not of unsound mind, but have
according to their kind, the use of reason. This is clear, because there is a
certain method in their affairs, for they have polities which are orderly arranged
and they have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and
workshops, and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason:
they also have a kind of religion. Further, they make no errors in matters which
are self-evident to others: this is witness to their use of reason.8
It is because of his acknowledgement of the humanity of the Indians of the
New World that Vitoria is remembered as a champion of the rights of
indigenous and non-European peoples. Equally, it is precisely because they
possess reason that the Indians are bound by a universal natural law. And yet
Vitoria also considers the possibility that, while there is an order apparent in
Indian affairs, it is a deficient order because it fails to meet the universal
criteria established by natural law:
Although the a~origines in question are (as has been said above) not wholly
unintelligent, yet they are a little short of that condition, and so are unfit to
found or administer a lawful State upto the standard required by human and
civil claims. Accordingly they have no proper laws nor magistrates, and are not
even capable of controlling their family affairs.9
As a consequence, Vitoria suggests that proper government must be
established over the Indians by the Spanish, who, he argues, must govern
as trustees over the uncivilised Indians. The Indians now are children in need
of a guardian. There is a gap, then, between the ontologically 'universal'
Indian and the historically, socially 'particular' Indian that can only be
remedied, it transpires, by the intervention of the Spanish, who are
characterised as the agents of natural law. Seen in this way, the recognition
of the humanity of the Indians has ambiguous consequences because it serves
in effect to bind them to a natural law which, despite its claims to
universality, appears derived from an idealised European view of the world,
based on a European identity. Consequently, it is almost inevitable that the
Indians, by their very existence and their own unique identity and cultural
practices, violate this law, which appears to deal equally with both the
Spanish and the Indians, but which produces very different effects because of
the asymmetries between the Spanish and the Indians.
The ramifications of these asymmetries become clearer when Vitoria
proceeds to enunciate the principles of natural law: 'The Spaniards have a
right to travel to the lands of the Indians and to sojourn there, so long as
they do no harm, and they can not be prevented by the Indians'. 10 These
apparently innocuous rights to trade and travel have profound consequences
for the Indians, for, as Vitoria further argues, "to keep certain people out of
the city or province as being enemies, or to expel them when already there,
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are acts of war'. 11 Thus, any Indian resistance to Spanish incursions would
amount to an act of aggression by the Indians that justified the Spanish in
using force in self-defence-and, in so doing, in endlessly expanding their
territory, conquering the native rulers in the process. Violence arises, in
Vitoria's system, through the inevitable violation by the Indian of the natural
law by which he is bound.
Once commenced, war, in Vitoria's scheme, has an overwhelming and
transformative character. It is through war that the aberrant Indian identity
might be effaced. It is clear, furthermore, that war against the barbaric
Indians has a different character from war waged against a civilised,
Christian adversary. In describing this war, Vitoria reverts to principles and
arguments developed earlier, in the times of the Crusades. The Indian is like
the Saracen, a pagan:
And so when the war is at that pass that the indiscriminate spoliation of all
enemy-subjects alike and the seizure of all their goods are justifiable, then it is
also justifiable to carryall enemy-subjects off into captivity, whether they be
guilty or guiltless. And inasmuch as war with pagans is of this type, seeing that
it is perpetual and that they can never make amends for the wrongs and
damages they have wrought, it is indubitably lawful to carry off both the
children and the women of the Saracens into captivity and slavery.12
The barbaric Indian exists beyond the existing rules of law; war against the
Indians is 'perpetual', their guilt or innocence is irrelevant. Thus, both bound
by the law and yet outside its protections, the Indian is the object of the most
extreme aspects of sovereignty, which can expand and innovate its practices
and manifestations precisely because of this peculiar, in-between status.
I have dwelt on Vitoria's work because it illustrates several crucial and
enduring aspects of the relationship between colonialism and international
law, and this in a text regarded as the first modern work of the discipline.
Vitoria's work demonstrates, for instance, the centrality of commerce to
international law, and how commercial exploitation necessitates war. It
shows, furthermore, how an apparently benevolent approach of including the
aberrant Indian within a universal order is then a basis for sanctioning and
transforming the Indian. The Indian is characterised in a number of different
and sometimes contrasting ways: as economic man anxious to trade with the
Spanish; as oppressed by his own rulers and looking to the Spanish to
liberate him; as backward and in need of guidance; as irredeemably and
hopelessly savage and violent. In each of these cases Spanish intervention
appears the appropriate response. And Spanish violence is characterised as,
simultaneously, overwhelming, liberating, transforming, humanitarian. My
argument, furthermore, is that Vitoria's attempt to address the problem of
difference demonstrates the complex relationship between culture and
sovereignty, for Vitoria's jurisprudence decrees that certain cultures-such
as that of the Spanish-are universal and enjoy the full rights of sovereignty,
whereas other cultural practices-like those of the Indians-are condemned
as uncivilised and non-sovereign.
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The same structure of ideas is evident in the 19th century, the apogee of
imperial expansion, and the period when positivism was established as the
major jurisprudence of international law. Unlike naturalism, which argues
that all states are subject to a higher universal law, positivism, in basic terms,
asserts that the state is the exclusive creator of law, and cannot be bound by
any law unless it has consented to it. There is no higher authority than the
sovereign, according to this system of jurisprudence. Nominally, at least,
under the system of naturalism both European and non-European societies
were bound by the universal natural law which was the foundation of
international law. I3 Positivist jurists, however, devised a series of formal
doctrines that used explicitly racial and cultural criteria to decree certain
states civilised, and therefore sovereign, and other states uncivilised and non-
sovereign. Thus non-European societies were expelled from the realm of
international law. Lacking legal personality, these societies were incapable of
advancing any legally cognisable objection to their dispossession, and were
thus reduced to objects of conquest and exploitation.
This law legitimised conquest as legal, and decreed that lands inhabited by
people regarded as inferior and backward were terra nullius. In other cases
imperial powers claimed that native chiefs had entered into treaties which
gave those powers sovereignty over non-European territories and peoples.
The ability of natives to enter into such treaties was paradoxical, given that
they were characterised as entirely lacking in legal status. What is clear from
an examination of the treaties, however, is that international lawyers granted
the natives such status, quasi-sovereignty, for the purposes of enabling them
to transfer rights, property and sovereignty. The right of the native to dispose
of himself or his resources was in effect upheld by these treaties, just as in
Vitoria native personality is established so that it may be bound by
international law.
Once again, Western standards were declared universal, and the failure of
non-Western states to adhere to these standards denoted a lack of civilisation
that justified intervention and conquest. Thus John Westlake, the Whewell
Professor of International Law at Cambridge, declared in 1894, that
'Government is the Test of Civilization' and elaborated:
When people of European race come into contact with American or African
tribes, the prime necessity is a government under the protection of which the
former may carryon the complex life to which they have become accustomed in
their homes, which may prevent that life from being disturbed by contests
between different European powers for supremacy on the same soil, and which
may protect the natives in the enjoyment of a security and well being at least
not less than they had enjoyed before the arrival of the strangers. Can the
natives furnish such a government, or can or can it be looked for from
the Europeans alone? In the answer to that question lies, for international law,
the difference between civilization and the want of it. 14
Westphalian sovereignty denoted the right of a state to establish its own
system of government within its territory. In the case of the non-European
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state, however, its internal system had to comply with standards that in effect
presupposed a European presence within that polity. Thus countries such as
Siam, which were never formally colonised, were compelled to enter into a
humiliating system of unequal treaties, capitulations according to which
foreigners were governed by their own law rather than that of the non-
European state. Non-European societies that failed to establish the
conditions in which Europeans could live and trade could then be justifiably
replaced by European governance, which proclaimed itself as bringing
with it civilisation and stability, and, indeed, better protection for the
natives themselves. Such government was essential and inevitable, as 'The
inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there is land to cultivate,
ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, sport to enjoy, curiosity to be
satisfied' .15
Many of the legal doctrines used at this time dealt not only with relations
between European and non-European states but between European states
who were intent on acquiring title over the non-European territories. These
doctrines were developed for preventing conflict between European states
over who had proper title to a non-European land. Thus, at the Berlin
Conference of 1884-85 the great European powers of the period met in
Berlin to decide on how Africa was to be divided among them. The resulting
division of the continent, which occurred with no regard to the complex
system of political organisation that operated within that territory, has
created enduring problems. 16
By the end of the 19th century European expansion had ensured that
European international law had been established globally as the one single
system that applied to all societies. It was in this way that European
international law became universal.
Decolonisation and the postcolonial state
The trauma of the First World War generated many changes in international
law and relations. Most significantly, the imperial character of the discipline
was recognised and criticised by scholars and statesmen in the inter-war
period who denounced the international law of the 19th century that had
legitimised colonial exploitation. The League of Nations attempted to
formulate a new approach towards colonies, which were now labelled
'backward territories'. Whereas in the 19th century the division between
Europe and uncivilised non-Europe had been formulated principally through
an elaboration of racial and cultural categories, the League of Nations
characterised the differences between the civilised and uncivilised in economic
terms, the 'advanced' and the 'backward'.
As a consequence of these shifts, the territories of the defeated powers (the
Ottoman Empire and Germany), rather than being acquired as colonies by
the victors, were placed under the authority of the Mandate System of the
League of Nations. I?
The purpose of this system was, through international supervision, to
ensure the 'well being and development' of the mandate territories;18 it was
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even contemplated that the most advanced territories, such as Iraq, would
become sovereign states. These territories were placed under the control of
Mandate Powers-Britain and France, most often-who acted as trustees on
behalf of the League towards the backwards peoples, and were ultimately
accountable to the League.
The League of Nations is studied most often in terms of its failed attempts
to prevent international aggression. For the Third World, however, what is
perhaps most important about the League was its attempt to create a set of
techniques that were uniquely devised for the specific purpose of transform-
ing backward, non-European societies into modern societies. Once more,
whereas the interior realm of Western states (and of course of their colonies)
was immune from international scrutiny by the League, the non-European
mandate territories were completely accessible to the technologies of this, the
first major international institution. The League's ambitions to establish
international peace were thwarted by the obdurate sovereignty of Western
states-and of Japan, which was in effect treated as a Western state. In the
case of the Mandate System, by contrast, the League was confronted by a
novel and contrasting task, that of creating sovereignty and promoting self-
government. As a consequence, once more, it was in the non-European world
that the League could devise legal, administrative and institutional
mechanisms to address this great challenge, and in so doing develop the
technologies of management and control that have become entrenched in the
repertoire of techniques subsequently used by international institutions.
While this project suggested the first attempts to achieve something like
decolonisation and to create an international law that would further rather
than suppress the aspirations of Third World peoples, the character of the
sovereignty to be enjoyed by the non-European peoples was problematic. As
Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the Indian Foreign Office recommended, regarding the
sovereign Iraq that Britain-the mandatory power-should bring into
existence:
What we want to have in existence, what we ought to have been creating in
this time, is some administration with Arab institutions which we can safely
leave while pulling the strings ourselves; something that won't cost very much,
which Labor can swallow consistent with its principles, but under which our
economic and political interests will be secure. 19
In essence, while the Mandate System worked towards the creation of
sovereign states, or at least politically developed, 'self-governing' societies,
both the 'sovereignty' and 'government' of the non-European society were
created with a view to furthering Western interests. Third world sovereignty,
then, at least to the extent that it was shaped by international institutions,
and by Western states acting through international institutions, was created
in a way that could continue to serve Western interests. Crudely put, an
examination of the Mandate System illuminates the ways in which political




The Mandate System, of course, did not apply to the victorious colonial
powers, such as Britain and France. Sustained nationalist protest by Third
World peoples, however, ensured that decolonisation had become a central
preoccupation of the international system. The United Nations responded by
creating a number of institutional mechanisms for the furtherance of
decolonisation, and by extending and adapting the doctrine of self-
determination to colonial territories. The newly independent states signifi-
cantly changed the composition of the international community, as they
became a majority in the UN system. Most significantly, this enabled the
sovereign Third World states to use international law and sovereignty
doctrines to further their own interests and to articulate their own views of
international law. The new states were especially intent on protecting their
recently won sovereignty and negating the enduring effects of colonialism.
Thus they sought to establish a set of principles that outlawed conquest and
aggression, and prevented intervention in Third World affairs. Further, the
new states used their numbers in the General Assembly to pass a number of
resolutions directed at creating a 'New International Economic Order,.20 This
initiative was especially important, as the new states realised that political
sovereignty would be meaningless without corresponding economic indepen-
dence. Thus the new states sought to regain control over their natural
resources through the nationalisation of foreign entities that had acquired
rights over these resources during the colonial period.
Issues such as the terms on which a state could nationalise a foreign entity
became particularly controversial. International economic law, which
determined these issues, became a central arena of struggle between the
West and the new states. The new states argued that this body of law had
been created by the West to further its own interests and that they had played
no role themselves in its formation. While several Western scholars
acknowledged the legitimacy of the claims made by the new states, Western
states argued that they were not bound by the principles authored by the
Third World because of the basic rule that a state could not be bound by
international rules unless it agreed to be so bound.21 Nevertheless, the West
proceeded to argue, the Third World was bound by the older rules of inter-
national economic law that the West had authored. Indeed, the West argued,
acceptance of these and the other established rules of the international system
was a condition of becoming an independent, sovereign state. In this context,
Third World sovereignty was again articulated principally as a basis for being
bound by international norms. The Third World initiatives, undertaken in
the belief that colonialism was embodied in certain specific doctrines relating,
for instance, to conquest or the rate of compensation payable upon
nationalisation, confronted the problem that the colonial past could not be
so easily excised from the discipline.
My argument is that colonialism had shaped not only those doctrines of
international law explicitly devised for the very purpose of suppressing the
Third World, but also had also profoundly shaped the very foundations of
international law, including the ostensibly neutral doctrine of sovereignty.
The end of formal colonialism, while extremely significant, did not result in
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the end of colonial relations. Rather, in the view of Third World societies,
colonialism was replaced by neo-colonialism; Third world states continued to
play a subordinate role in the international system because they were
economically dependent on the West, and the rules of international economic
law continued to ensure that this would be the case.
The acquisition of sovereignty by the Third World state had numerous
other repercussions. The postcolonial state, in many ways, adopted the
models of development, progress and the nation-state that had first been
articulated in the Mandate System and that had been further refined and
elaborated by development theories such as modernisation theory. The
leaders of these states sometimes consisted of elites with close ties with the
West; in other cases they derived their power from affiliations with
superpowers in the context of the ongoing Cold War. Further, Third World
states divided along ethnic lines experienced civil wars as different ethnic
groups fought for control of the state.
The postcolonial state, then, engaged in its own brutalities: women,
minorities, peasants, indigenous peoples and the poorest were the victims.
The international human rights law that emerged as a central and
revolutionary part of the United Nations period offered one mechanism by
which Third World peoples could seek protection, through international law,
from the depredations of the sometimes pathological Third World state. It
was for this reason that international human rights law held a special interest
and appeal for Third World scholars.
Human rights law was controversial, however, precisely because it
legitimised the intrusion of international law in the internal affairs of a
state: it could be used to justify further intervention by the West in the Third
World. Aspects of this intervention became evident after the collapse of the
USSR and the intensification of globalisation. The ascendancy of neoliberal
economic policy and the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
presented new challenges to Third World states. International financial
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank played an increasingly
intrusive role in the economies of Third World states, and attempted to use
their considerable powers to reform the political and social structures of these
states, this in the name of promoting 'good governance', a project that
entailed drawing in various strategic ways on international human rights law.
The virtues of good governance are apparently self-evident. But the meaning
of the terms remains open and contestable and these institutions attempted to
use an amended version of human rights law to further their neoliberal
policies in the guise of 'good governance', rather than enabling real
empowerment of Third World citizens. In this way these international
institutions, which proclaimed that the project of 'good governance' was
entirely novel and necessary, were in many ways replicating the earlier efforts
of their predecessor, the Mandate System and its efforts to promote 'self-
government'. The demand made by the international financial institutions
(IFIS) that these states reform their internal arrangements was compared by
some scholars with the system of capitulations that had previously been used
by European states to demand the reform of non-European states.22
749
ANTONY ANGHIE
Towards the present: the 'war on terror'
Following the 9/11 attacks many international law and international
relations scholars argued that a new and unique threat confronted the
international community, and that established international law was
inadequate for the challenges it presented. As a consequence, scholars
proposed a range of theories that purported to reform the laws of war,
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights to address these
new realities. What these arguments generally overlooked is that Third
World countries themselves have suffered the worst consequences of
terrorism for many years without attempting, as the USA is now doing, to
dismantle the fundamental norms of international law relating to human
rights and the use of force established by the system of the UN Charter, all in
the name of effecting this supposedly essential adaptation.
What is clear, however, is that the 'war on terror'-articulated in the
National Security Strategy of the USA and now launched by that country-
with its willingness to use pre-emptive force against 'rogue states' and its
ambitions to transform Middle Eastern countries into peace-loving democ-
racies, resembles in many ways a much earlier imperial venture. The rhetoric
employed by President Bush to justify the invasion of Iraq disconcertingly
resembles the rhetoric used by Vitoria to justify the Spanish conquest of the
Indians. Once again, then, it is the barbaric, the uncivilised, that has prompted
a concerted attempt to reconstruct international law. Ironically, however,
these efforts to create a new international law appropriate for the allegedly
unprecedented times in which we live have involved returning to a primordial
and formative structure of international law, the civilising mission. This has
resulted in the formulation of a new form of imperialism that asserts itself in
the name of 'national security', as self-defence.
The imperial dimension of these initiatives is so explicit and unmistakable
that even scholars and institutions who were largely indifferent, if not
impervious, to the phenomenon of imperialism have begun to focus on the
relationship between imperialism and the international system. A large and
sometimes dishevelled literature has resulted, and prominent Western
scholars such as Niall Ferguson have argued for the return of an imperial
system of management headed by the USA.23 There is a happy assumption
made in much of these supposedly expert writings-the validity of which has
only been questioned by the violence in Iraq-that imperial rule would be
welcomed and acquiesced to by those who are subjected to it.
There are certain dangers associated with this sudden focus on imperial-
ism, and not only because of the calls for its return. I would argue that the
Iraq episode and the war on terror more generally are simply very explicit
and obvious examples of imperial practices. Imperialism is experienced in
the Third World, I would suggest, in a much more everyday way through,
for example, international economic regimes, supported and promoted by
international law and institutions that systematically disempower and sub-
ordinate the people of the Third World.2~ This is the 'everyday' imperialism,
the quotidian and mundane imperialism, that is accepted as somehow normal
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and that is furthered and promoted not only by the USA, but by European
states that otherwise have opposed US policy in Iraq. Much has been made on
both sides of the Atlantic about the differences between Europe and the
USA.25 But, I would argue, whatever separates Europe and USA, they are in
many ways arguing for different versions of an imperial international system,
one more explicit than the other. For the Third World, I suspect, imperialism
is not an aberration that has emerged with the US actions in Iraq. Rather,
imperialism is an integral aspect of day-to-day international relations. What is
required, then, is an understanding of how imperial relations and structures of
thought continue to operate in an ostensibly neutral setting. This would reveal
how imperialism has always been a part of the international system, as
opposed to a phenomenon that has suddenly emerged with the US war on
terror and against Iraq.
The current war on terror involves the return of a much older form of
imperialism. Equally, however, there is a certain novelty about the present
that requires closer analysis, as the USA's policy appears to be premised on
the belief that only the use of force and the transformation of alien and
threatening societies into 'democratic' states will ensure its security.
I have argued that the transformation of the peoples and polities of the
non-European world is a continuing preoccupation of international law from
its Vitorian beginnings. That transformation was seen principally in terms of
enabling economic exploitation; now, however, the transformation of the
non-European world is seen as essential for physical security.
Yet what events in Iraq and elsewhere have suggested is that US policies
have only exacerbated the situation, and are more likely to generate
resentment and retaliation. The paradoxes emerge: while proclaiming to
further human rights, the USA has persistently violated them, while seeking
to prevent terrorism, it has generated further violence. There is a cycle of
violence here that could make the attempts to create a Kantian world of
peace-loving democratic states into a guarantee of endless war rather than
perpetual peace.
Conclusions
The use of international law to further imperial policies is, I have argued, a
persistent feature of the discipline. The civilising mission, the dynamic of
difference, continues now in this globalised, terror-ridden world, as
international law seeks to transform the internal characteristics of societies,
a task which is endless, for each act of bridging generates resistance, reveals
further differences that must in turn be addressed by new doctrines and
institutions. This is not to say, however, that these imperial ambitions and
structures have always prevailed; rather, they have been continuously
contested at every level by Third World peoples. Equally, of course, Third
World states have often engaged in what might be regarded as colonial
practices, in relation both to other, smaller states and to minorities and
indigenous peoples within their own boundaries. Colonial practices, further,
suffer from their own contradictions and incoherence. But they certainly
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pervade every aspect of the discipline. The questions that then arise are
whether, how and to what extent international law can be used for the
purposes of furthering the interests of Third World peoples-protecting them
against the excesses of the authoritarian and sometimes genocidal state, on
the one hand, and advancing their interests in the international sphere on the
other. Third World international lawyers, immediately following the period
of decolonisation, placed a special faith in international law, believing that it
could achieve these results. However, this faith proved unfounded, and many
international initiatives that were explicitly humanitarian and anti-colonial-
such as the Mandate System-became a vehicle for imperialism. As a result,
some scholars have eloquently argued that the Third World should dispense
with international law altogether. But this not a feasible option, simply
because that would leave open the field of international law to the imperial
processes I have sketched, and this in a context where international law plays
an increasingly vital role in the public sphere, where questions of violation,
injury, legitimacy are all discussed in terms of international law. Interna-
tional law operates, I have tried to suggest, at every level: international and
national; economic, political and social; private and public. And it is in all
these arenas that it is now imperative to understand the operations of
imperialism and how they might be opposed and overcome. This is an issue
that must surely concern all international lawyers, North and South, who
intend international law to make good on its promise of furthering the cause
of global justice.
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